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STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.

Case No. 960234-CA

:

VAO BOYD HUNSAKER,
Priority No. 2
Defendant/Appellant.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO AND ACCEPTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE ENFORCED PURSUANT
TO THE PLEA IN ABEYANCE STATUTE.
Appellee argues that if the defendant was not happy with the

sentencing he was free to withdraw his guilty plea, but made no
effort to do so. While it is true that defendant could have moved
to withdraw his plea, it is also true that a plea in abeyance
agreement had been entered into and accepted by the trial court.
It is submitted that defendant was also free to stand by the plea
in abeyance agreement and have it enforced pursuant to the plea
in abeyance statute.

This is in fact what the defendant has

attempted to do. The trial court, on the other hand, was not free
to ignore the statute.

1

II.

WHILE DEFENDANTS REQUEST TO TREAT HIS APPEAL AS INTERLOCUTORY
MAY BE UNUSUAL, THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY DEALT WITH UNUSUAL
SITUATIONS BY MAKING UNUSUAL DISPOSITIONS.
It is true that defendant's request to this Court, to treat

his appeal as interlocutory if it determines that the trial court's
order was not final, is unusual.
with unusual cases before.

However, this Court has dealt

In the case of State v. Dietz,

(unpublished memorandum decision, September 6, 1996, Case No.
9507 69-CA), this Court stated that
the unusual posture of this case prompts us to make an
unusual disposition, but one that is appropriate under
the circumstances. Cf. State v. Ford. 793 P.2d 397, 405
(Utah App. 1990) (f,Given this imperfect state of affairs
and the highly unusual posture of this case, we believe
justice requires a remedy which is itself unusual.").
This case is indeed unusual.

It would be a surprise if we

were to find a case in Utah where a defendant has been lawfully
incarcerated pursuant to a plea in abeyance agreement whereby the
charge would ultimately be dismissed if the defendant complied with
all conditions.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal twenty three days after
entry of the trial court's order, not thirty five days after and
not eight months after, as appellee has attempted to argue.
Defendant was only three days late for filing a petition for
permission to appeal an interlocutory order.

The interests of

justice would not be served in this case if this court refused to
examine this case on its merits merely because the notice of
appeal, while filed within the time limit for appeals of final
2

orders, was filed a mere three days late for an interlocutory
appeal.
The unusual posture of this case and the interests of justice
warrant this Court making an unusual disposition.
III. IMPOSITION OF A FINE WAS PLAIN ERROR.
Concerning imposition of the fine on defendant, apparently
there was a miscommunication between counsel and the trial court at
the sentencing hearing. However, there can be no doubt that if the
trial court had given even a cursory look at the statute it would
have been plain that a fine was not allowed under the statute.

It

is therefore submitted that it was plain error for the trial court
to impose a fine upon defendant, no matter what counsel may or may
not have said in court. While the amount of the administrative fee
levied on the defendant can legally be the same amount as any fine
that could have been imposed, the defendant cannot be fined.
court can only impose an administrative fee.

The

While this error

could have been corrected simply by calling it an administrative
fee, the exchange between counsel and the trial court illustrates
the court's lack of understanding of, or even the desire to
understand the plea in abeyance statute.
defendant was plain error.
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Imposing a fine on

IV.

THE TERM "SENTENCE" DOES NOT REFER TO "PRISON SENTENCE," AS
THE STATUTE DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FELONIES AND
MISDEMEANORS CONCERNING SENTENCING.
Appellee argues, inter alia, that the trial court didn't

sentence defendant because it did not send him to prison.

The

trial court attempted to make this argument below, but evidently
believed the argument to be weak, as indicated by its lack of
response to counsel's retort.

Counsel argued:

If we construe this subsection E as liberally as I think
the State would have the court do, then the court could
do what the State says here, impose any conditions upon
imposition of sentencing. The reason that doesn't make
sense to me is because if you can impose anything you can
do upon a conviction and sentencing, then it is
sentencing. We just call it something else.
THE COURT: Except as a condition of probation. In other
words, one of the things you can't do is send someone to
prison.
MR. BOUWHUIS: That's correct. However, if we read the
statute carefully, the statute doesn't distinguish
between misdemeanors and felonies.
(R. at 40)

In fact the legislature demonstrated in the statute

that it is cognizant of the difference between

felonies and

misdemeanors by according some differing treatment to each.

For

example, section 77-2a-2(4) (b) requires that for felonies the plea
in abeyance must be in writing.

Further, section 77-2a-2(5)

states:
A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer
than 18 months if the plea was to any class of
misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea was to
any degree of felony or to any combination of
misdemeanors and felonies.

4

Those are the only two portions of the statute which address any
distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, and nowhere does it
state that "sentencing" means "prison."

Clearly, a defendant who

enters a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor charge (pursuant to a plea
in abeyance agreement or otherwise) could never be sent to prison,
though he could be sent to jail if he violated the agreement.

The

statute states that there is to be no conviction and no sentencing,
and does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors.

The

argument was specious below and it remains so here.
No matter how the State chooses to label it, the trial court
sentenced the defendant, in violation of the plea in abeyance
statute.
CONCLUSION
The plea in abeyance agreement in this case was entered into
and accepted by the trial court, and should therefore be enforced
pursuant to the plea in abeyance statute.

While the defendant

should not have been sentenced, the imposition of a fine and
incarceration did in fact constitute a sentence, regardless of the
label the State chooses to put on it.

The fact that the trial

court did not sentence defendant to prison is of no consequence, as
the term "sentence" does not mean "prison sentence."
abeyance

statute

does

not

distinguish

between

The plea in

felonies

and

misdemeanors regarding sentencing.
Wherefore, defendant respectfully prays that this Court will

5

remand his case for the proper imposition of conditions in
accordance with the law.
7~ day of January 1997,
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